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On the Roots of Undiscipline

Steve Harfield, University of Technology Sydney, Australia

Abstract
Variously used to describe a branch of knowledge, a system of rules of
conduct or a method of practice, or a character trait associated with rigorous
and controlled behaviour, the term ‘discipline’ is both widespread in its
application and yet considerably under-examined in regard to its
expectations and consequences. While the general field of design, or each of
the various sub-fields thereof, is colloquially referred to as being a discipline –
and unreflectively accepted as such – quite what constitutes and informs this
disciplinarity remains unclear. Arguing that design problems are, to a
significant extent, personally determined rather than neutrally provided; that,
while highly informed in regard to their disciplinary practice(s), design agents
are inescapably influenced, driven, and, to large measure, controlled by their
specific theory choices and ideological commitments; that, rather than being
a knowledge-generating discipline, the field of design generally constitutes a
practice-based knowledge-utilization discipline, aimed at providing service to
an external world; and thus that design is essentially normative rather than
explanatory-descriptive; this paper explores the nature of design’s
disciplinarity, and avers that the above factors not only actively contribute to,
but promote and prolong design’s undisciplinarity. Design’s very
characteristics are thus the roots of its undiscipline, roots that go deep into
design’s psyche, and that support and feed an enterprise that is in need of
serious self-examination.
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“I was a producer of materiality and I am ashamed of this
fact…Everything I designed was unnecessary…design is a dreadful form
of expression.” (Starck, 2008)
To say that one belongs to or works within a discipline is to assert a degree of
commonality, perhaps a shared knowledge base, a set of agreements about
issues central to that discipline, assumed skills or competencies, and so on.
Belonging to a discipline implies, at least at some level, a more-thanlayperson’s familiarity with and understanding of the content of that discipline,
a level of commitment to the discipline (even if one is critical of it), and an
appreciation of the scope and extent of that discipline, i.e. an understanding
of the cloud-like boundary that sets this discipline apart from that one, and
allows us to distinguish one from the other.
That disciplines cannot be precisely and absolutely defined; that there may
be disciplines within disciplines within disciplines; that disciplines overlap and
interact; and that new disciplines emerge and evolve as knowledge and
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technology develops is not the issue here. What is at issue is design’s
understanding of what it means to describe design as a discipline. Hence,
what constitutes disciplinarity? Which aspects of commonality – of knowledge,
of skills, of competencies, of key issues, of expectations, of assumptions –
speak of ‘being a discipline’, in a way that somehow elevates ‘practice’ to an
appropriately intellectual and abstract-conceptual level, and which aspects
merely suggest a grouping of workers engaged in ‘the same kind of thing’? Is,
then, design (or particular instances of design, from fashion and graphic
design to product design and architecture) a discipline? Or does it remain, in
significant respects, an undiscipline, a set of extant practices, valuable and
highly respected in themselves, that aspire to but crucially do not reach
disciplinary status?
Given the vagueness of the word itself, this question is perhaps both formless
and unanswerable, at least in any absolute sense. Yet, it will be contended,
the question is nevertheless useful insofar as it elicits a number of responses in
respect of what it is that design does, of how design conceives of itself, and,
of most significance for this paper, of certain practices, certain presumptions
and certain absences that condition how design ‘works’ and thus how its
disciplinarity is enacted.
This paper advances three (perhaps contentious) propositions that might
account for the potentially undisciplined nature of design thinking and design
practice.

(The Undiscipline of) Personal Problematization
The first of these addresses the nature of problems in design, specifically
proposing that, in crucial ways, designers construct the problems that they
seek to solve.
This is not to deny what is usually taken to be self-evident, namely that design
problems are presented to designers by external agencies (clients), nor that
the problems thus presented are, to a significant extent, defined by the range
of specific requirements that constitute what is commonly termed the brief.
What is rejected, however, is the conventional understanding that assumes
that it is this problem – the unmediated problem received from the external
world, or, as I have termed it elsewhere, the problem-as-given – that the
designer ‘solves’ (Harfield, 2002; 2007a; 2007b).
Such an assumption does not, of course, oblige the believer to assert that all
solutions to any given problem must perforce be the same, but it does lead to
the further, and often under-examined, assumption that differences between
solutions are the result of differences in the skills, talent, level of experience
and creativity of individual designers and/or of the plurality of different
‘satisficing’ solutions that design problems allow. Nothing wrong with this, we
might think: individual designers surely do have different levels of experience,
and are possessed of and exhibit in their practices differential degrees of
talent, skill and knowledge. Indeed so, but what is missed in this analysis is its
grounding in the ‘different designers / same problem’ scenario.
The shortcomings of this common, if misguided, assumption I have argued at
length elsewhere (Harfield, 2002; 2007a). Suffice it to say that it is my
contention that it is not this ‘problem-as-given’ that the designer ‘solves’.
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Rather, each designer ‘problematizes’ and individuates the problem-as-given
in order to construct an augmented problem – dubbed the problem-asdesign-goal – that, in any given case, will establish the basis of, and actively
inform, direct and focus the individual designer’s actual solution search. While
initiated by ‘real-world’ problems extrinsic to the designer, and without wilfully
ignoring or recklessly deforming said problems, design proceeds by
internalising and ‘moulding’ such problems to ‘fit’ the individual designer. Thus
is created a substantially revised and personalized problem that both
subsumes the original problem and imposes upon it a range of designer
preferences, prejudices and expectations. Whether such problematization,
such ‘moulding to fit’, is conscious or unconscious to the designer must lie
outside the scope of this paper, although it should be noted that the very
conception of design as objective problem-solving, as a kind of neutral
engagement between the well-trained designer and the problem that lies
outside and is thus effectively at one remove from her or him, is deeply
undercut by these suggestions.

The significance of this is two-fold.
From the perspective of an analysis of designing, it will be clear that, starting
from the same initial brief, different designers will necessarily produce different
outcomes, not merely on the basis of differential skill sets but because, in
substantial ways, they are solving different problems. This ‘problematization’ of
the initial brief, different for each designer and for each project, thus informs
and constrains both the design activity and the final outcome in ways that are
not dictated by the brief itself. Moreover, such problematization will, in each
individual case, substantially establish, not to say dictate, the nature and
range of the actual solution possibilities and thus determine the set of criteria
that will be used to judge the eventual outcome. More than simply a set of
feedback loops, then – indeed, more than merely co-evolutionary – problem
setting, solution generation, and criteria determination constitute an almost
inextricable matrix of design determinants.
From the perspective of an analysis of disciplinarity – and claims of a neutral
and rationally determined problem-solving process notwithstanding – the
above suggests that not only is every design outcome intensely personal, but
so too is design itself. Nothing wrong with this, we might say again, nor, indeed,
is there. But, it might be suggested, the consequence of such acceptance of
the centrality of the individual and the effective self-determination of design
problems is that what we share, both under the aegis of the general term
‘design’ and within any individual sub-discipline thereof, is a set of generalized
practices based on an assumed but by no means highly codified knowledge
base, informed, to more or less degree, by a variety of different, frequentlychanging and essentially normative theoretical imperatives, and perhaps
restrained or directed by a similarly disparate set of ethical strictures.
The combination of such generalized sharing with an active and
institutionalised desire to assert individuality suggests disciplinarity only in a
sense akin to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblances’: while we might
have no trouble recognising – and valuing – design, it remains undisciplined to
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the extent that its theoretical and intellectual base, and, significantly, its
relations with the ‘real world’, remain essentially contingent.

Explanatory Absence
This notion of contingent connection to the real world, while not necessarily
deleterious to design’s disciplinary expectations and ambitions, does suggest
a potentially informative comparison. My second proposition therefore looks
to the long-established disciplines represented by the physical sciences,
suggesting that what such sciences have, and what the design disciplines
conspicuously lack, is the unifying agency not just of a coherent knowledge
base, or a set of agreed practices or skills or intentions, but of what, at any
given time, might colloquially be called a set of ‘current major problems’
within that discipline / sub-discipline, i.e. both a shared understanding of, and
a commitment to, certain key questions which, were they to be successfully
answered, would advance knowledge within the discipline – and thus
advance the discipline itself – in significant ways, simultaneously generating a
new set of current questions. While not every scientist within a given discipline
is actively working on such problems, their existence, and the acceptance of
their fundamental importance to that discipline, provides an established
intellectual focus and a key driver to that discipline’s progress.
In contrast it might be proposed that, if, on the one hand, design is replete
with personal (or personalized) problems, on the other it effectively has no
problems at all, at least in the scientific sense of agreed conceptual difficulties
at the boundaries of knowledge within the field!
Such conceptual difficulties – or, perhaps better expressed, the
acknowledged presence within the given discipline of a set of key intellectual
impasses which both identify the current gaps in disciplinary knowledge at a
fundamental level, and signal the direction of future research work needed to
resolve such issues and thus forward the discipline – is the hallmark of the
physical sciences. This is manifest in science’s attitude to and understanding of
the term ‘theory’ as indicating intellectual structures, rigorously constructed in
relation to, and eminently testable against, external and quasi-objective data
established as part of that discipline’s extant knowledge base, that seek to
explain the nature of (some aspect of) the external world. As Appiah (2003,
p.144) notes, it "...seems impossible...to conceive of science without theory.
The development of theories about how different parts of the world work is
what science is for. If you don't want scientific theories you don't want
science". In a similarly instructive observation, Kerlinger (1973, p.8) suggests
that "The basic aim of science is theory", to which he immediately adds,
"Perhaps less cryptic, the basic aim of science is to explain natural
phenomena".
By contrast, design lacks most of these characteristics. And while this does not
necessarily discount its aspirations to disciplinarity – not every discipline need
be ‘scientific’ in this sense – it does highlight a number of key differences in
intentionality and in self-perception.
If scientific theories might conveniently be termed ‘explanatory’ theories, in
that they are rigorously constructed in order to explicate some aspect of 'how
the world is' (or, consistent with the nature of scientific theories, how the world
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was and how it will be), then theories within design may best be characterized
as being ‘normative’, i.e. means by which we seek to delineate and/or
promote 'how the world should be'.
Design is thus not aimed at explaining the world but at responding to,
changing and, hopefully, advancing it – precisely what we would normally
understand by the phrase ‘designing’ it. Design’s engagement with the real
world is thus not primarily with natural phenomena, but with – to use Simon's
(1979) well-established term – the artificial, and the determination and
development thereof. Design’s theories, then – or what stand in for theories –
inevitably, and perhaps regrettably, tend to the rhetorical, the opinionated,
the assumptive, and the ideological. They are propositional and ‘directional’
insofar as they comprise indicators and exhortations of what the future world
should be – or, at least, those aspects of it amenable to, and of sufficient
interest to, this particular presumption of ‘designing’. They are thus not only
highly time- and situation-dependent – a characteristic that may well be laid
at the feet of scientific theories – but also highly personal, even if such
personal views are the representation and expression of group sensibilities and
intentions – maybe even those of the whole discipline – to which any given
individual, knowingly or unknowingly, subscribes.
To some extent, then, design’s disciplinarity evokes that of a service industry,
with its emphasis on supplying the world rather than explaining it, and with its
knowledge base being tied more to the development and codification of
practice skills, to the uptake and utilization of advanced materials, new
technologies and the latest manufacturing techniques, and to the progress –
some may well say the mere establishment of ongoing differences – of form,
aesthetics and taste, than to the pursuit and development of knowledge per
se.

The Drive of Ideology
But perhaps this is an unkind and unreasonable critique. What might be called
such ‘knowledge questions’, so intrinsic to science’s perception of itself, and
thus to its workings, are not – and, it might be suggested, have no need to be
– central to design’s activities and aspirations. If design is a knowledgedependent discipline, this does not mean that it is, or is required to be, a
knowledge-generating one in the sense indicated above, and design
outcomes should be analysed in terms of their efficacy in ‘solving’ real-world
problems and in providing, in a variety of respects, means for a better future.
And yet, while this might be a plausible retort, it does leave unanswered the
question: ‘in the absence of agreed, discipline-wide ‘current major questions’,
à la the physical sciences, what is it that establishes ‘design directions’ in a
disciplinary sense, what is it that directs or ‘controls’ how and in what manner
our thinking proceeds?’ In answer to this my third proposition suggests
ideology as the central driver of design intentions and design practice. In the
absence of key major problems at the forefront of knowledge, design is, at
any given time and varying from time to time, directed by, conceived within,
and thus constrained by, a set (or competing sets) of ideas, beliefs,
assumptions and preconceptions which structure not only how the designer
will think about design, but, more significantly, how s/he could not have
thought otherwise.
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Drawing upon de Tracy’s original denotation of the term as “…the ‘science of
ideas’ which would reveal to men the source of their biases and prejudices”
(Bell, 1999, p.414), ideology here is intended to connote both “…an
interpretative scheme used by social groups to make the world more
intelligible to themselves” (Bell, 1999, p.414) and “…a conceptual scheme with
a practical application” (Blackburn, 1994, p.185), although perhaps the most
useful contemporary usage might well be Railton’s notion of ideology as a
normative position, “…standing for a collection of beliefs and values held by
an individual or group for other than purely epistemic reasons” (1995, p.392).
In this sense then, design, like any other ideologically-determined enterprise, is
driven not only by collective normative beliefs – agreements among group
members as to how the world should be – but by contingent normative beliefs
– agreements based on particular, loaded, and often idiosyncratic views of
how the world is, and therefore how it should be. Such views – personal
subscriptions within a group identity – can appear so blindingly self-evident
that they are accepted unquestioningly, naturalized and neutralized by their
familiarity, their acceptability, and their undeniable desirability.
Hence, ideology is clearly Janus-faced. If, as Mautner (1996, p.201) suggests, it
inescapably imposes “…a kind of obstacle to rational thought and clear
perception” on its adherents, then simultaneously it provides not only the
impetus to future action and forward movement, but supplies the very
guidelines and ‘rule-books’ of such action.
This returns us to our earlier notion of problematization, and to the assertion
that this personal projection of ‘self’ onto ‘problem’ is reliant not just on the
explicit knowledge and skills of the individual designer, but on the often
intuitive and unconscious reliance on the belief structures and theory
commitment that ideology so neatly provides. While design problems are
inevitably individuated problems insofar as they are ‘solved’ by a single or a
small team of designers, at any given time both the frame and the design
language within which these designers work have a certain commonality
within the discipline, even if they represent one from among a number of
competing theoretical frames prevalent at that time.
As both a constraint on, and a generator of, action, ideology (or, more
accurately, ideologies in the plural) thus comes to provide a kind of quasidisciplinarity to design. But it remains a disciplinarity of contingency; a
disciplinarity that shifts with our time, our culture, our views of the world, and
the needs that world demands of us. And while ‘design’ might recognise more
‘big picture’ issues, such as sustainability and resource management, and
aspire to universal agreement about their significance and their centrality to
design thinking, such concerns tend to represent the need for generalized
ethical standpoints, rather than being the equivalent of science’s intellectual
problems at the root of the discipline itself.

The Effect of Discipline?
But what of ‘discipline’ itself? What of the idea of discipline as pertaining to
rigour, to constraint, to the disciplining of oneself, akin, as one of my referees
suggested, to the term’s meaning in the phrase ‘military discipline’?
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Now, in this sense, ‘discipline’ and ‘rigour’ come with tied suggestions, with
positive connotations. Rigour is a good thing. It suggests that we don’t just ‘do
as we please’. It suggests that we are somehow in control, that we know what
we are doing, and that we are not only capable of carrying something out
but that we will do so in a way that conforms to some accepted and
previously understood notions of correctness or best practice.
It suggests that not only do we know and believe some true or proper – or, at
the very least, learned and accepted – path, but that we will not be diverted
or drawn aside’ from it by our own preferences, our desires, our weaknesses,
and thus not by the seduction of ‘other things’. It thus connotes the strictly
observed, the appropriately constrained, the carefully enacted, and is not to
be confused with the slapdash, the loose or lazy, the careless, and the merely
wilful.
Hence, it suggests the accurate following of accepted strictures, viz: that
while we, as agents, are in control, our control resides in applying to the
situation something that lies outside ourselves; something that is established,
tested, and accepted not only by ourselves but by the larger design
community; and hence something that consolidates and legitimises and
focuses our knowledge in ways that go beyond the personal. It thus suggests
positive boundaries; suggests that we know the accepted limits and that we
keep inside them, not in a timid way but in a way that ensures that we are
acting responsibility and knowingly, in a way that secures the best possible
outcome because of the discipline that we bring to our actions.
Yet at the same time, the combination of rigour and boundaries suggests that
the creative designer is not forced to exist solely within this frame, but can
bridge or exceed these boundaries, not by mistake but in a way that allows
for growth, change, development. And again, not by mere whim, but by
reason – and by reason of having an established and trustworthy base. In this
sense the very idea of ‘boundary’ suggests the phrase ‘reculer pour mieux
sauter’ – to draw back in order to leap better.
The suggestion here, of course, is that one is leaping forward, beyond the
existing boundaries, and that by so doing the boundary itself is not merely
exceeded but either enlarged or challenged in a positive way. Thus, we may
ask, do the boundaries act as surfaces off which we can rebound? The idea
of ‘pushing the envelope’ or ‘stretching the boundaries’ suggests both that
we learn from the resistance that we encounter in such pushing, and that we
have some inkling of how and why and where to push precisely because this
is what the current boundary, the current conventions and preferences and
expectations of the discipline, show us. Without boundaries we would have no
resistance which could inform us and which we use as our test. And we would
have nothing against which to react, nothing that would provide the very
springboard which we use to power our leap.
But what of discipline as negative constraint? While discipline has thus far
been dealt with under the positive connotation of the gathering of facts and
knowledge and skills such that, crudely speaking, we all know them and that
we know all of them, the antithetical connotation of constraint, particularly
with military discipline in mind, is that we do what we are told, that we know
what we should do and what our limits are in terms of allowable action.
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It also suggests expectations – expected actions because we know what we
should be doing – plus responsibility and obeying orders. Encapsulated in the
very idea of military discipline – and worth considering in the current context –
is that we have given ourselves over to this situation; that the context in which
we find ourselves is self-induced, agreed upon in advance, and known to the
agent such that the agent finds no difficulty in obeying the orders, and in
knowing what the orders and expectations are in advance. Hence,
preparedness and the willingness to comply.
Such willingness to comply also suggests the idea of a greater good. We do
not obey the rules simply because the rules are there – rules are not autotelic –
but rather because we accept, either tacitly or explicitly, that the rules are
there for good purpose. Hence, we accept the rules in advance and agree to
abide by them.
Of course, from an ‘external’ perspective, military (and by implication any
other) discipline can suggest to the critic an image both of inflexibility and of
pettiness; of having rules about trivial matters; of having rules for everything
where no rules are necessary; and of insisting and enforcing these rules for the
sake of rule-enforcement. Here the suggestion is of a lack of freedom; of
following a pre-set path; of trading free choice for known rules; of jettisoning
creativity and inspiration in favour of established albeit, one presumes,
successful ways of doing things.

Conclusion
If design clearly does not fall under such draconian constraints, we might
nevertheless ask what is the nature of disciplinarity in design?
If, as suggested above, design is an essentially personal enterprise, involving
individuated problems at the discretion of the designing agent; if such
personal individuation itself is circumscribed and controlled by the ideology
subscribed to by that agent, whether consciously or otherwise; if design itself is
not a knowledge-generating enterprise but a practice-based service industry,
creating what it provides without adding to knowledge per se; and if design
therefore lacks major discipline problems at the level of fundamental
knowledge, then perhaps it must be conceded:
(i) that design is fundamentally driven by its inherent preconceptions
and determinate choices about how the world shall be seen and thus how
the future world should be enacted;
(ii) that it is thus held together by a series of conventions; conventions
which, while we may choose to believe them and to subscribe to them – or
see them simply as self-evident ‘facts’ of the world which neither require nor
are amenable to choice –remain, like ethics, consensual, conventional,
contingent and communal, determined by and applying to the given design
community of the time;
(iii) that to this extent design is essentially self-referential; and therefore
(iv) that design disciplines are not like scientific disciplines – nor have
any need to be so – and are thus not expected to share universal or
universally-agreed problems at the level of fundamental knowledge that
establish the very intellectual base upon which that discipline is grounded.
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Thus we may say that, if the sciences frame their disciplines in the form of
‘what we know, or what we need to know, about the world’, and may thus be
characterised as disciplines of reflection, of ‘doing in order to know’, then
design clearly frames its questions along the lines of ‘what should we do…’ or
‘how should we do…’ and may be characterised as a discipline of action, of
‘doing in order to achieve’; hence, a performative discipline aimed at asking
fundamental questions of a different kind: how do we provide for the
requirements of the world, and how do we provide for the requirements of the
world better and/or differently?
Insofar as this is the case, then we might also suggest:
(v) that design must inescapably labour under the weight of a supplyside disciplinarity;
(vi) that, even as it seeks a more unified and more rigorous conception
of itself as a discipline, design remains both ‘internalized’ – essentially it looks to
itself for its purported rigour and intellectual base – and fragmented – is there
really a design discipline in toto, or should we accept – and actively
encourage – the fact that design’s supposed sub-disciplines are the real
carriers of disciplinary rigour and knowledge, and that they exist, and should
exist, as separate and independent entities?
Howsoever we may read these propositions it is reasonable to suggest that all
the factors discussed above constitute not only the roots of, but continuing
reasons for, undiscipline. And how we can move from such undiscipline, or
whether we need to at all; how disciplinarity is to be established beyond the
mere sharing of skills and practice-knowledge, and beyond the contingent
values of a shared community, or whether the codification, legitimation and
enhancement of design knowledge, practitioner skills, practice ethics, and
engagement with key societal issues is precisely the disciplinarity that is
required, remains a moot point, albeit one that is in clear need of further
discussion, clarification, and, perhaps above all, awareness.
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